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A B S T R A C T
As the world considers greener forms of economic growth, countries and sectors are beginning to
position themselves for the emerging green economy. This paper combines patent data with
international trade and output data in order to investigate who the winners of this ‘‘green race’’
might be. The analysis covers 110 manufacturing sectors in eight countries (China, Germany, France,
Italy, Japan, South Korea, UK and the US) using date for the period 2005–2007. We identify three success
factors for green competitiveness at the sector level: the speed at which sectors convert to green
products and processes (measured by green innovation), their ability to gain and maintain market share
(measured by existing comparative advantages) and a favourable starting point (measured by current
output). We ﬁnd that the green race is likely to alter the present competitiveness landscape. Many
incumbent country-sectors with strong comparative advantages today lag behind in terms of green
conversion, suggesting that they could lose their competitive edge. Japan, and to a lesser extent
Germany, appear best placed to beneﬁt from the green economy, while other European countries (Italy in
particular) could fall behind. However, the green economy is much broader than the few ﬂagship sectors
on which the debate tends to focus, and each country has its niches of green competitiveness.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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Policy-makers increasingly place economic growth at the
centre of discussions over environmental management. They
would like environmental policy to bring much-needed jobs, new
technologies and competitiveness to domestic industry, as well as
to protect the environment. Creating new market opportunities is
an explicit objective of green growth policies in Europe (European
Commission, 2012). China is promoting seven strategic industries
(including, among others, clean energy, environmental protection
and clean cars) that it hopes will place it at the forefront of green
growth (Stern, 2010, 2011). South Korea, too, has made green
growth a strategic priority (Ministry of Government Legislation,
2010).
This vision is supported by the emerging ‘‘green growth’’
literature. Counterbalancing calls for de-growth (Jackson, 2009;* Corresponding author. +44 20 71075427.
E-mail address: s.fankhauser@lse.ac.uk (S. Fankhauser).
0959-3780  2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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Open access under CC BYMartı´nez-Alier et al., 2010), proponents of green growth assert that
environmental stewardship is no impediment to economic
prosperity, and may in some cases be a spur to growth (Bowen
and Fankhauser, 2011; World Bank, 2012; Jacobs, 2013). Yet, the
factors that affect the potential of environmental policy to improve
competitiveness are poorly understood. And, perhaps as a
consequence, there is little evidence about who the winners of
the global ‘‘green race’’ might be.
This study contributes both to the conceptual understanding
and to the empirical discussion of green competitiveness. We
present an analytical framework based on decomposition analysis
that can help to structure a discussion that has so far lacked a
consistent analytical foundation. The framework identiﬁes three
success factors for green competitiveness at the sector level: the
speed at which sectors may convert to green products and
processes (measured by green innovation), their ability to gain and
maintain market share (measured by existing comparative
advantages) and a favourable starting point (measured by current
output). We apply this framework to 110 manufacturing sectors of
eight major economies, based on a large data set that combines
patenting activity by over 127,000 ﬁrms with international sector-
level trade and output data. Our analysis covers China, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the UK and the United States. license. 
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competitiveness landscape. Several incumbent country-sectors
with strong comparative advantages today lag behind in terms of
green conversion, suggesting that they might lose their competi-
tive edge. Manufacturers in Japan, and to a lesser extent Germany,
appear best placed to beneﬁt from the green economy, while those
in other European countries (Italy in particular) could fall behind.
However, the green economy is much broader than the few
ﬂagship sectors on which the debate tends to focus, and each
country has its niches of green competitiveness.
Our sector-level analysis relates to a long-running debate about
the link between competitiveness and environmental performance
at the level of ﬁrms (Porter, 1991; Porter and van der Linde, 1995;
Reinhardt, 1999; Esty and Winston, 2009). The empirical evidence
from the ﬁrm-level literature is not always conclusive. For
example, Martin et al. (2011) ﬁnd that climate-friendly manage-
ment practices are associated with lower energy intensity and
higher productivity. Becker and Shadbegian (2009) in contrast ﬁnd
that ‘green’ manufacturing ﬁrms do not systematically outperform
‘non-green’ manufacturers on indicators such as survival, export
growth, employment growth and productivity, although they pay
higher wages.
There is also a debate about the role of industrial policy in
shaping the green economy. Some authors see a need for industrial
policy due to information externalities (e.g. Hausmann and Rodrik,
2003). Others argue that the information constraints on policy-
makers are prohibitive and that industrial policy has played only a
minor part in recent industrial successes (Pack and Saggi, 2006).
What is clear is that business interest in the green economy
depends on good and consistent public policy. Sound environ-
mental policies (e.g. a price on carbon) with long-term credibility
are essential to correct basic market failures and give environ-
mental services a monetary value (Costantini and Crespi, 2008;
Fankhauser, 2012; Kennett and Steenblik, 2005). Without them
business interest soon dries up.
We do not aim to add to the industrial policy or innovation
debate in this paper, and indeed we would caution against trying
to infer too many policy implications from our ﬁndings. Our aim
is simpler and more descriptive: To add to the understanding of
green competitiveness at the sector level, focusing (somewhat
narrowly) on manufacturing. This is a question of considerable
interest to policy makers, as a series of policy reports and country
performance rankings attest (e.g. Ernst and Young, 2008;
ECORYS, 2009; Henderson et al., 2013; Pew, 2010; WWF,
2012). However, at the sector-level a rigorous assessment based
on a clear analytical framework has so far been lacking. We also
assemble a detailed new dataset that can help with further
research in this area.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section outlines
the analytical framework that underpins our analysis. In Section
3, we present the data and introduce proxies for the three factors
we use to assess green competitiveness. Section 4 presents
results for the eight countries we consider and some key
manufacturing sectors. Section 5 concludes.
2. Understanding green competitiveness
2.1. What is a green economy?
There is an established tradition of measuring the contribution
to GDP of the environmental goods and services sector. In the
deﬁnition of the OECD, environmental goods and services include
all activities that measure, prevent, limit, minimise or correct
environmental damage (OECD, 1998). Other deﬁnitions vary
(Steenblik, 2004), as do numerical estimates, but it is clear that
according to this delineation the green economy is worth severalhundred billion, and perhaps several trillion, US dollars a year
globally (EBI, 2012; ECORYS, 2012; BIS, 2011).
Yet, for many of its proponents green growth is about
something more radical (Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011; Jacobs,
2013). Green growth advocates do not see environmental
management as just another economic sector alongside conven-
tional activity. They argue that the economic changes required to
combat problems like climate change are not marginal, as most
traditional models suggest, but transformative and system-wide
(Perez, 2010; Stern, 2010). The creation of a green economy will
therefore affect not just a few sectors but the product mix and
production processes of virtually the whole economy.
Consistent with this literature, we interpret green growth as an
economy-wide transformation, rather than the expansion of the
environmental goods and services sector. We are equally
interested in the structural changes within a sector (say, the
emergence of low-emissions technology in car manufacturing) as
in the expansion of one sector (such as solar panel production) at
the expense of another (such as coal mining).
The idea of countries competing for market share in an
emerging green economy is rooted in our understanding of the
organic, bottom-up dynamics of national and sectoral innova-
tion systems (Archibugi et al., 1999; Dosi et al., 1988; Malebra,
2002). Systems of innovation are distinct networks of public and
private institution within countries and sectors that initiate,
coordinate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies.
Innovation systems may explain why some sectors excel at
adapting to and exploiting the opportunities presented by a
green economy. Our expectation is that differences across
innovation systems will reveal large differences in the respon-
siveness of sectors and countries to the opportunities in the
emerging green economy.
The competitiveness literature suggests that green competi-
tiveness is most likely to be derived from existing comparative
advantages, skills and production patterns (Hidalgo et al., 2007;
Hausmann and Hidalgo, 2010). For example, Germany developed a
comparative advantage in wind turbines on the back of its existing
expertise in high-precision machining (Huberty et al., 2011). We
therefore treat existing capabilities as a key indicator of future
comparative advantage in the green economy. This does not
preclude market entry and exit at ﬁrm level. The idea of ‘creative
destruction’, where new ﬁrms and new ideas drive out the old
(Schumpeter, 1942), is central to the type of transformative growth
that the green economy discourse espouses (see also Aghion and
Howitt, 1998, 2009; Dosi et al., 1988; Malebra, 2002; Oltra and
Saint Jean, 2009; Perez, 2002).
Structural change of this scale will create both winners and
losers. Some economic activities will be scaled back, and if there
are rigidities in relative wages, skills and production techniques,
this will lead to a temporary drop in output and employment
(Babiker and Eckaus, 2007). At the same time, the rewards could be
massive for the winners of the ‘‘green race’’, which obtain a
comparative advantage in environmentally benign products and
processes.
Although they are used here, terms like ‘‘race’’, ‘‘comparative
advantage’’ and ‘‘competitiveness’’ should be interpreted with
caution (as famously argued by Krugman, 1994). Firms are
competitive if they offer products and services that are in demand
in the market place (e.g. because they are cheaper or of superior
quality). Countries gain a comparative advantage (and specialise)
in areas where they can produce with lower opportunity costs
relative to others. But the notion of a race between countries, or
competitiveness at the country level, is misleading (Voituriez and
Balmer, 2012). What ultimately matters at the national level are
real incomes and productivity. The countries that develop a
comparative advantage in greener goods and services will beneﬁt
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policies around the world raise the relative demand for such
products. But other countries beneﬁt, too, if the shift in demand
towards greener goods and services is met by supply from nations
with a comparative advantage in producing them, keeping their
relative prices lower than otherwise.
2.2. An analytical framework
To establish who is best placed to succeed in an expanding
green economy we start with a hypothetical question: When
future statisticians look back, how will they document the
transition from the economies of the 2010s to the increasingly
green economy of the 2030s and 2040s?
We postulate that future statisticians might use the same
analytical tools that today’s economists and statisticians use to
disentangle the factors that determine a country’s energy
efﬁciency, that is, tools such as index number theory and
decomposition analysis (e.g. Boyd et al., 1987; Ang and Zhang,
2000; Cornillie and Fankhauser, 2004; Boyd and Roop, 2004;
Metcalf, 2008; for a non-energy application, see Antweiler et al.,
2011).
They might start with an equation that describes the size of the
green economy in country i at time t, Git, as the sum of green output
in each sector s, Gist, where Gist is further decomposed as follows:
Git ¼
X
s
Gist ¼
X
s
gist  mist  Yst (1)
Yst denotes global output from sector s at time t, and is deﬁned as
the sum of country-level outputs, Yst 
P
iYist. Furthermore,
gist  Gist/Yist is the green share in the economic output of sector
s in country i, and mist  Yist/Yst is the international market share of
country i in sector s.
Future statisticians would then proceed to differentiate this
equation with respect to time. They may also undertake a series of
permutations to express change in discrete, rather than continu-
ous, time (see e.g. Boyd et al., 1987; Metcalf, 2008). This would
allow them to document how the size of the green economy
changes, time period by time period, as a result of changes in the
three constituent elements of Eq. (1), that is, green conversion
(changes in the share of green output relative to total sector output,
gist); changes in market share, mist, and changes in the size of a
sector worldwide, Yst.
Before approaching this task, we make two simpliﬁcations. First
we focus on the green output potential of individual country-
sectors, Gist, rather than the size of the entire economy, Git. This
allows us to ignore the sector summations, and we can simplify the
notation by dropping sector and country subscripts.
Second we move the total sector size, Yst, to the left-hand side of
the equation. This creates a new left-hand variable Gt  Gist/Yst,
which measures green production in a sector and country relative
to global sector size.
Making these adjustments, differentiating the simpliﬁed
equation with respect to time and integrating back, we get the
following expression for relative green production at a future time
T:
G T ¼
Z T
0
@gt
@t
 mtdt þ
Z T
0
@mt
@t
 gtdt þ G 0 (2)
Eq. (2) tells us that future green output in a country-sector, relative
to global sector output, depends on three trends:
 Green conversion, that is, the speed with which the green segment
of the market will grow within a country-sector (e.g. the rise inrenewable electricity at the expense of conventional power
generation within the electricity sector).
 Change in the market share of a sector, that is, the ability of a
sector to outpace the overall rate of growth (e.g. growth in
electricity production as clean electricity replaces fossil fuels
in heating and transport).
 The importance of green production at the outset (i.e. renewable
power generation today, relative to global power generation)
Eq. (2) also makes clear that the conversion process does not
have to be smooth. It is the integral over a dynamic process that
may include ups and downs. We know from economic history, for
example, that there may be rebound effects and competing
innovation in non-green products and processes (Fouquet, 2010).
This is sometimes called the ‘‘sailing ship effect’’ after the
incumbent technology threatened by innovation where the effect
was ﬁrst observed (Graham, 1956).
Nevertheless, the three factors above, in all their complexity,
are the drivers we need to understand and estimate if we want to
assess the readiness of country-sectors (and for that matter, ﬁrms)
to compete in an increasingly green economy. The ﬁrst two
together indicate the green growth potential in a sector and will be
of particular interest below. The third factor determines the
starting point, but also the relative importance of a sector in
the global economy.
3. Measuring green competitiveness
When documenting the emergence of the green economy,
future statisticians will be able to track the three trends of Eq. (2) ex
post and measure their relative importance using actual data. In
contrast, our analysis is forward-looking. The ﬁrst two components
of Eq. (2) in particular cannot yet be measured in the way future
statisticians will be able to. The third component, green production
today, should in principle be observable, but it turns out that the
data to measure it meaningfully are poor.
We therefore require a set of lead indicators that let us predict
the three future trends ex ante. In other words, we are looking for
indicators of country-sector performance today that are correlated
with leadership in the green economy tomorrow, and can serve as
proxies for, future green conversion, future market share and green
production today. Although the conversion processes we antici-
pate are dynamic (as Eq. (2) makes clear), the lead indicators
associated with them can be static, and they will necessarily be
imperfect. No indicator can predict accurately a complex dynamic
process several decades into the future. Nevertheless, the aim is to
ﬁnd the most credible such indicators at the level of country-
sectors.
3.1. Green conversion
The most promising indicator for green conversion, that is, the
speed at which green output will replace conventional products
and processes, is green innovation. The focus on innovation, rather
than investment, is consistent with the view that ‘‘creative
destruction’’ is the engine of transformative growth (Archibugi
et al., 1999; Oltra and Saint Jean 2009; Perez, 2002). Innovation
alters products and production processes much more profoundly
than does investment, although the two processes are obviously
linked. While investment determines the future capital stock,
innovation determines how radically different that capital stock
will be. More broadly, there is a well-documented link between
innovation, productivity and economic growth (Aghion and
Howitt, 1998, 2009; Griliches, 1979; Temple, 1999), and between
innovation, industrial dynamics and industry evolution (Dosi et al.,
1988; Malebra, 2007, 2002).
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innovation activity, which measures the ratio of green patents
to total (green plus non-green) patenting activity. The advantages
and limitations of patenting as a measure of innovation have been
discussed at length (see Griliches, 1990; and OECD, 2009, for a
recent overview). While patents are not a complete manifestation
of innovation, they are a core output measure that features
prominently even in complex assessments of innovation perfor-
mance (for example, Dutta, 2012; Hollanders and Es-Sadki, 2013).
A key advantage for our purpose is that patent data are available
at a highly disaggregated level. This allows us to map innovations
in clean technologies, such as renewable energy technologies,
electric vehicles, energy-efﬁcient cements, insulation devices, and
so on. R&D expenditures cannot be disaggregated by type of
innovation in this way. Further, R&D spending is typically only
reported for large ﬁrms, whereas our data are available for all
patent holders, including small and medium-sized enterprises.
Patent data have been used successfully in numerous studies of
green innovation (for example, Dechezlepreˆtre et al., 2011;
Johnstone et al., 2010; Lanjouw and Mody, 1996; Popp, 2002).
An important limitation is that possessing a patent does not
imply that the owner will actually use the technology and
incorporate it into new products. Yet the high expense of patenting
deters the patenting of technologies that are unlikely to be
deployed. Filing a patent costs around s5000 in Japan, s10,000 in
the US and s30,000 at the European Patent Ofﬁce (Roland Berger,
2005). Inventors are therefore unlikely to apply for patent
protection unless they are relatively certain of the potential
market value for the technology. In the absence of information on
market shares of green technology-based products, we use patents
as a second-best indicator of green conversion.
Our Green Innovation Index (GII) takes the following form,
which is similar to Waltz and Eichhammer (2012). For a broader
discussion of innovation indices see Grupp (1994):
GIIis ¼
pGis= pisP
i p
G
is= pis
(3)
where pGis is the number of green patents and pis the total number
of patents in sector s and country i. The index thus measures the
share of green patenting in a particular country-sector, compared
to green patenting in that sector over the entire reference area
(that is, the eight case study countries). The normalisation against
broader patenting activity is important to correct for idiosyncrasies
in patenting behaviour in particular sectors or countries. Indeed,
evidence shows that the propensity to use patent differs widely
across sectors (Cohen et al., 2000).
The higher the GII for a sector and country, the higher the share
of green innovation in that sector, compared with other countries,
and the more rapid (we conjecture) the conversion from
conventional to green production.
3.2. Change in market share
Drawing on Hidalgo et al. (2007) and Hausmann and Hidalgo
(2010), our conjecture is that the future market share of a country
in a particular sector is related to its comparative advantage today.
Sectors with a competitive edge today are more likely (but not
certain) to be successful in the future. Despite its basis in the
competitiveness literature, this is a strong assumption in
the context of a deep structural transformation.
A widely used way to measure comparative advantage is the
Balassa index (Balassa, 1965). The Balassa index measures
the revealed comparative advantage (RCA) of a country-sector
on the world market by calculating its relative export share. There
are several variants of the index, each with its own advantages anddisadvantages (Iapadre, 2001; Laursen, 1998). We use the
standard formulation, which has the following structure (see
also Welfens et al., 2010 for a sustainability application of RCA-
style indicators):
RCAis ¼
eis=
P
seisP
ieis=
P
s
P
ieis
(4)
where eis is the level of exports from sector s in country i. The
numerator measures the share of exports in a country-sector,
relative to total exports from that country. This is put in proportion
to the same ratio (sector exports over total exports) for all
countries in the sample. Unlike equation (3), which measures
green innovation in absolute terms, the focus in the RCA formula is
on sector exports relative to a country’s total exports, i.e. on a
country’s comparative (rather than absolute) advantage. The
higher the relative share of exports in a country-sector, the higher
is its RCA and the more competitive is the sector.
This indicator offers a ﬁrst indication of a particular country-
sector’s ability to gain and maintain market share in the future,
although there are clear limits to using past shares as a predictor of
future market shares in the presence of technology diffusion and
major transformations driven by green innovations. Another
drawback of the RCA is that it excludes sectors in which there is
no international trade, such as some services.
3.3. Green production at the outset
The main way of measuring green economic output to date has
been to identify at a high level of disaggregation (e.g. ﬁve- and six-
digit level) the sectors whose activities are deemed to contribute to
environmental protection and aggregate their output into a single
value for the green economy (OECD, 1998; BIS, 2011). This
approach tends to categorise sectors dichotomously as either
‘environmental’ or ‘non-environmental’, rather than assessing
more broadly the share of green production in all sectors of the
economy. A study that does the latter is HSBC (2009), which
calculates the green revenues earned by the world’s listed
companies. The HSBC indicator conﬁrms that much of the green
revenue does not accrue in explicitly green sectors, but may, for
example, concern the wind turbine division of an engineering ﬁrm
or the biofuel activities of oil companies.
To assess the readiness of individual sectors for the green economy,
we need a measure of the starting position for every sector and not just
for those that have been deﬁned as ‘green’ by today’s standards. To this
end we use total sector output as a proxy for total sector green output.
A country-sector with a high level of total output is assumed to have a
proportionally high level of green output therein. Naturally the
strength of the relationship between total and green output varies
across sectors and, with green conversion, will change in future. Yet
total output offers a reliable, empirically measurable starting point
that is consistent with our measure of initial comparative advantage
(based on exports) and our rate-of-conversion measure based on green
patenting. The level of green output denotes the relative importance of
a sector within a country, or the proportion of output within a sector
globally that is attributable to a country.
4. Empirical evidence
We next turn to the empirical analysis of the three key factors
that predict competitive success in the green economy. According
to the analytical model (Eq. (2)), the three factors are additive and
could in principle be combined into a single indicator of
competitiveness in the green economy. We are not doing this
and instead consider the three factors separately. Their interplay is
discussed in qualitative terms. The additive structure of Eq. (2) only
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proxies we use.
The unit of analysis in our dataset is the country-sector. We
consider 110 manufacturing sectors at the four-digit industry level
(ISIC Rev. 3 codes 1511-3699, see Annex) in eight countries (China,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, US and UK). All eight
countries have large, globally competitive manufacturing bases,
which offer scope for comparison between country-sectors. For 38
sectors output data were not available (6 in China, 4 in France, 7 in
Germany, 3 in Italy, 6 in Japan, 1 in the UK and 11 in the US) and
these are excluded from output-related statistics.
The 110 sectors in our sample play different roles in today’s
economy with respect to the environment and its protection. The
sample includes sectors that cause most environmental damage
during production, such as pulp, paper and paperboard. It includes
sectors whose output causes most environmental damage at the
consumption stage, such as motor vehicles, and sectors whose
output may cause most damage in the ﬁnal disposal stage, like
processing of nuclear fuel. The sample also includes sectors which
may or may not be relatively benign in their own environmental
footprint, but which have the potential to contribute to the
greening of other sectors. One such sector is electricity distribution
and control apparatus, which holds the key to smarter electricity
grids.
The empirical data come from a number of sources. Patent data
are taken from the Orbis database, maintained by Bureau Van Dijk.
The Orbis database records the patent portfolio of over 500,000
companies worldwide. The 4-digit sector classiﬁcation of the
patent holders is also available, which allows us to match
individual patents to economic sectors. In order to identify green
patents, we use the environment-related patent classiﬁcation
developed by the European Patent Ofﬁce (EPO) and the OECD. In
particular, we use the recently developed Y02 class from the
European Classiﬁcation System (ECLA), which covers patents
related to ‘technologies or applications for mitigation or adaptation
against climate change’ (see Veefkind et al., 2012, for more
information on the Y02 class; the list of environment-related
patent classiﬁcation codes is available from http:\\www.oecd.org/
environment/innovation). The RCA indicator was calculated using
the UN Commodity Trade Statistics (ComTrade) database, while
data on current output come from the UN’s INDSTAT4 industrial
statistics database.
For each indicator, we took averages over several years to
smooth out year-on-year ﬂuctuations. The base period is the mean
of the years 2005–2007, except current economic activity in China,
which is for 2004/05. This has the advantage of avoiding the
cyclical effects of the post-2007 economic crisis but the
disadvantage of ignoring the latest structural trends in rapidly
developing countries like China. In selected sectors, the empirical
analysis is complemented by a descriptive analysis based on
conversations with sector and country specialists.Table 1
Aggregate indicators of green competitiveness.
China France Ger
Median RCA 0.7 1.0 0
Median GII 0.7 0.6 0
Number of sectors with GII > 1 33 31 44
Median RCA of sectors with GII > 1 0.7 1.0 1
Output in sectors with GII > 1 (% of total)a 25% 34% 40%
Number of sectors with GII = 0 30 42 21
Median RCA of sectors with GII = 0 1.0 0.9 0
Output in with GII = 0 (% of total)a 9% 17% 4%
Number of sectors with RCA > 1 42 55 48
Median GII of sectors with RCA > 1 0.4 0.6 0
Output in sectors with RCA > 1 (% of total)a 44% 56% 56%
a Excluding sectors for which output data are missing.4.1. Basic statistics
We start with some basic aggregate statistics to gain an initial
sense for the green competitiveness of each country. Table 1 shows
a considerable degree of homogeneity with respect to revealed
comparative advantage (RCA), which should not surprise in a
sample of leading export nations. However, there is a clear leader
in green innovation (GII, our measure of green conversion), where
Japan has the strongest scores for most indicators.
Japan is the only country with a median green innovation index
that is greater than one. It has 61 sectors with above-average green
innovation, the highest number of any country by some distance.
These sectors account for two-thirds of Japan’s manufacturing
output, compared with 20–40% elsewhere. Japan also has the
deepest level of green innovation in its 15 largest manufacturing
sectors. Japan’s leading position in green manufacturing appears to
be long-lasting and was already observed in some very early
studies on the green race in the 1990s (Voituriez and Balmer,
2012). Some industry experts attribute this to Japan’s ‘‘patenting
culture’’ – patent numbers is or has been an explicit performance
indicator at companies like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, for
example – but the GII indicator corrects for such country-level
differences by focusing on the green share in patents within a
country.
Among the European countries considered, Germany has the
strongest record on green innovation, second only to Japan’s. In
contrast, the other European countries appear to fall behind. Italy
in particular has the poorest record of all eight countries, but
there are also some alarming results for the UK, and to a lesser
extent France. France, Italy and the UK are the only countries
where the median green innovation score is below the median
RCA, implying an overall innovation performance that is worse
than the current competitive position. The three countries also
have the lowest number of sectors with competitive green
innovation scores (GII > 1) and most sectors without any
green innovation at all.
For the remaining countries, the picture is mixed, although
according to our data China’s innovation record is also
quite patchy. This is at odds with the ambitions expressed in
China’s latest ﬁve-year plan (Stern, 2010), and we should
expect China’s performance to improve as the objectives of the
ﬁve-year plan are implemented.
4.2. Results by country-sector
The picture becomes more nuanced as we delve deeper into the
green performance of individual country-sectors. An instructive
way of presenting country-sector data is through scatter diagrams,
such as those in Figs. 1 and 2, which plot revealed comparative
advantage (RCA) on one axis and green innovation (GII) on the
other. The importance of each sector at the outset (its share inmany Italy Japan S. Korea UK USA
.9 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.7 0.8
.9 0.4 1.1 0.9 0.4 1.0
 24 61 40 29 45
.0 1.1 0.6 0.5 0.8 0.9
 18% 65% 29% 26% 37%
 43 11 22 52 16
.5 0.9 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.6
 30% 3% 3% 24% 7%
 51 36 22 31 40
.9 0.4 1.1 0.9 1.0 1.0
 51% 47% 46% 32% 55%
Fig. 1. Potential areas of green competitiveness by country. Note. For presentational purposes, the scales for both Revealed Comparative Advantage (x-axis) and the Green
Innovation Index (y-axis) were adjusted to make the distributions (which are right-skewed) appear symmetric. Excludes 38 country-sectors for which output data are
missing.
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bubbles.
For both the RCA and the GII, scores between zero and one
indicate a below-average performance. The sample average across
the eight countries is one, and scores greater than one signify
above-average performance. Green competitiveness thus increases
as we move to the top and right of the charts.
Fig. 1 includes all 880 country-sectors. It shows green
innovation and areas of comparative advantage over a diverse
mix of activities that is much broader than the keystone sectors
typically associated with green growth (i.e. clean energy, clean cars
and resource efﬁciency). The wide range of green innovation
conﬁrms that green growth concerns most, if not all, parts of a
modern economy. To illustrate the point, the top three sectors in
green innovation in each country include areas such as general
purpose machinery (China, Italy, USA), electrical equipment
(Korea) and hand tools/general hardware (France, Germany, Japan,UK, USA), as well as in keystone sectors such as electricity
distribution (which features in all countries except Korea).
Similarly, countries’ comparative advantages are in areas such
as toys (China), wine (France), motorcycles (Japan) and distilling
(UK), although strategic sectors feature in Korea (shipbuilding) and
the US (aircraft manufacture, weapons). Italy’s strong comparative
advantage in machinery for metallurgy is also of note, given that
much of the innovation in the strategic steel sector takes place at
the leading plant-makers.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to look at the most important
sectors of the economy in more detail. Fig. 2 therefore replicates
the scatter plots for the 15 biggest sectors in each country by
output. Typically, the top 15 sectors account for around 50% of
manufacturing output.
Both sets of scatter plots (Figs. 1 and 2) suggest that there is only
a weak connection between green innovation and comparative
advantage. Over the full sample, the correlation is mildly positive
Fig. 2. Potential areas of green competitiveness, 15 biggest sectors only. Note. For presentational purposes, the scales for both Revealed Comparative Advantage (x-axis) and
the Green Innovation Index (y-axis) were adjusted to make the distributions (which are right-skewed) appear symmetric. The sector labels are explained in the Annex.
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in areas of current comparative advantage. However, in two
countries, China and Italy, it is negative.
The weak correlation suggests that the green race is likely to
alter the competitiveness landscape. The leading country-sectors
of today may not be the dominant producers in the green economy.
Particularly at risk are the country-sectors located in the
bottom-right quadrants of the scatter plots. They currently enjoy a
strong comparative advantage (high RCA score), but are not leading
on green conversion (low GII score) and could over time lose their
competitive edge. Prominent incumbent sectors in this category
include pharmaceuticals in France, plastics in Italy and chemicals
in the UK. More generally, we observe a low level of green
innovation among the largest leading sectors in China, Italy, Korea
and to a lesser extent the UK (Fig. 2).
However, it is difﬁcult to draw general conclusions. Aircraft
manufacture in France and the UK both fall into the bottom-rightquadrant, but industry experts feel the green race between Europe
and the US, the other leading manufacturer, is still neck-and-neck.
Similarly, iron and steel in China, another country-sector in the
bottom-right quadrant, should be protected by a strong domestic
market as long as China’s construction boom continues. Korea’s
leading steel maker, Posco, is known for its ability to adopt
innovations quickly and implement them at scale. This skill is not
reﬂected in our GII score.
Another group that could struggle in the green economy is
the surprisingly large number of country-sectors with a GII score
of zero. These are sectors that show no evidence of green
conversion, even though there is green innovation at the
international level. In France, Italy and the UK between 40
and 50 sectors (out of 110) fall into this category (Table 1
above). They are important economic activities, which account
for 30% of manufacturing output in Italy, 24% in the UK and 17%
in France. (Note that sectors without any green innovation
Table 2
Top 15 sectors (by output) with comparative advantage and green innovation
scores greater than one.
GII score RCA
score
Output
(% of sample)
China
Other fabricated metal products 1.1 1.0 1.7%
France
Basic iron and steel 3.1 1.1 2.2%
Dairy products 2.8 3.0 2.6%
Motor vehicles 1.2 1.4 9.8%
Germany
Motor vehicles 2.2 1.2 13.0%
Parts/accessories for automobiles 1.6 1.5 4.3%
Other fabricated metal products 1.6 1.3 1.4%
Italy
Structural metal products 1.2 1.0 2.6%
Parts/accessories for automobiles 1.1 1.1 1.9%
Japan
TV and radio receivers, assoc. goods 4.0 2.1 4.6%
Motor vehicles 1.7 1.3 8.0%
Other special purpose machinery 1.5 2.5 2.5%
Parts/accessories for automobiles 1.1 1.6 7.5%
Electronic valves, tubes, etc. 1.0 2.2 3.8%
South Korea
Basic chemicals, except fertilizer 1.4 1.2 3.6%
Other special purpose machinery 1.2 1.1 1.8%
UK
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal
chemicals, etc.
1.8 1.9 3.3%
Measuring/testing/navigating
appliances, etc.
1.0 1.6 1.6%
USA
Electronic valves, tubes, etc. 1.6 1.3 2.5%
Plastics in primary forms, synthetic
rubbers
1.4 1.3 1.8%
Basic chemicals, except fertilizer 1.2 1.2 3.4%
Parts/accessories for automobiles 1.2 1.3 2.7%
Measuring/testing/navigating
appliances, etc.
1.2 2.1 1.9%
Air craft and spacecraft 1.0 3.6 2.9%
Note. All country-sectors with a score of 1.0 are rounded down. Country-sectors
with a rounded-up score of 1.0 are not included.
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countries).
The GII = 0 group includes areas where green patents are rare
even at the global level, including several agribusiness sectors, but
it also covers sectors where there is considerable green innovation
internationally, and which are of strategic importance in a green
economy. Examples include steam generators (no green innova-
tion in any country except Germany and France), nuclear fuel
processing (no country except France), pulp and paper (nothing in
France, Italy, UK), steel (Italy), batteries (UK), cement (UK) and
engines and turbines (Korea).
The country-sectors most likely to replace complacent incum-
bents are those located in the top-left quadrants of the scatter
plots. These country-sectors do not currently enjoy a comparative
advantage (low RCA score), but could break into the market on the
back of their strong green innovation record (high GII score).
Reﬁned petroleum products might see this shift, with France, Japan
and the UK all outperforming Korea and the US, which have the
highest RCA scores, on green innovation. However, the reﬁning
sector as a whole could lose in economic importance as the world
moves away from fossil fuels as a source of energy (Fankhauser,
2012).
The areas of particular promise in the green economy are
those located in the top-right quadrants of the scatter plots,
since they exhibit comparative strength in both RCA and GII. The
full list (shown in Fig. 1) is an eclectic and diverse mix of 115
country-sectors (i.e. about 13% of the sample), which reﬂect the
breadth of the green economy. However, among the top
15 sectors by output we ﬁnd many of the key strategic sectors
of the green economy (Fig. 2 and Table 2). First and foremost are
motor vehicles, which feature on the French, German and
Japanese lists (and, through car parts and accessories, the US
one). The list also includes iron and steel (France) and aircraft
manufacture (USA), as well as areas of traditional strength in
countries like the UK (pharmaceuticals) and Japan (electronic
goods).
4.3. Results for selected sectors
Our data can also be used to show which countries enjoy a green
competitive advantage within speciﬁc manufacturing sectors.
While the green economy is diverse, there are several strategic
sectors whose transformation is central to the creation of a green
economy. In Fig. 3, we explore eight of them.
The areas we study include industrial processes, which need to
become cleaner and more resource efﬁcient (e.g. iron and steel);
sectors that are important for energy efﬁciency, both on the
demand side (domestic appliances) and the supply side (electricity
distribution systems); the supply chain for electricity generation
and other industrial processes (steam generators; engines and
turbines; electric motors and transformers); and car manufactur-
ing, both directly (motor vehicles) and further up the supply chain
(accumulators/primary cells/batteries, where progress is needed
for electric cars).
The innovation literature shows marked differences in the
market structure and organisation of innovation activity between
sectors (Malebra, 2007). Some sectors are characterised by
structural stability and innovative activity is concentrated in a
few incumbent ﬁrms. In other sectors, innovation is dynamic and
turbulent, with frequent market entry and innovation activity
across a wide population of ﬁrms.
We observe some of these patterns in the eight sectors of Fig. 3.
In two sectors, engines and turbines and motor vehicles, green
innovation is driven by the leading country-sectors. There is a clear
positive link between green conversion and comparative advan-
tage. In a further two sectors, domestic appliances andaccumulators/primary cells/batteries, there is little difference
across countries in terms of green innovation.
In these four sectors, the current competitive landscape may
prevail. In the case of motor vehicles, car manufacturers in France
(e.g. Renault) and Japan (e.g. Toyota) have been at the forefront of
electric and hybrid car developments, while German manufac-
turers have pushed conventional technologies. Among the other
countries, recently tightened emissions standards in the US might
trigger more green innovation in the important American market.
The UK has traditionally specialised in high-end vehicles with high
emission factors (the successful Mini apart), but Jaguar Land Rover,
the main producer, has now started to lower emissions in some
models. Newcomers like China sometimes see green technology as
a way of breaking into this highly competitive market, but so far
the data do not bear this out.
In iron and steel and for steam generators, there is little
variation in comparative advantage, but there are marked
differences in green innovation. Especially intriguing is the
dichotomy in steam generators, where green innovation is
concentrated in just two countries, Germany and France. The
absence of Japanese innovation in particular is surprising, given the
record of companies such as Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and
Kawasaki Heavy Industries. It is possible that their innovation
Fig. 3. Green competitiveness in selected sectors. Note. For presentational purposes, the scale for both Revealed Comparative Advantage (x-axis) and the Green Innovation
Index (y-axis) was adjusted to make the distributions (which are right-skewed) appear symmetric. The country labels are: CHN = China; DEU = Germany; FRA = France;
GBR = United Kingdom; ITA = Italy; JPN = Japan; KOR = South Korea; USA = United States of America.
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turbines.
In iron and steel, two relatively small producers, France and the
UK, are leading the ﬁeld. This is unlikely to alter the competitive
landscape in the long run, however, which is driven largely by
factors such as labour and energy costs. In the case of France,
the high GII ratio reﬂects a substantial research presence in the
country by big international producers like Arcelor Mittal. The UK
position may be related to leadership in building-related steel
design, an important area for innovation, but one that may require
stronger building regulations to fulﬁl its potential. It is also worth
remembering that our analysis is omitting important steel
producers such as Russia and Ukraine. Their success is based
primarily on good access to raw materials, rather than innovation.
One interesting pattern in the remaining two sectors (electricity
distribution and electric motors/generators/transformers) is the
position of Korea and surprisingly also the UK and the US, whichare mid-ranking in terms of comparative advantage, but strong on
green innovation. If this persists they might be able to catch up
with the current leaders.
Overall, all eight countries have areas of promise, but also clear
weaknesses, in the strategic sectors. The relatively weak position of
China reﬂects a manufacturing industry that during our 2005–07
snap-shot was heavily dependent on low and mid-level technolo-
gies, combined with low labour cost. China experts believe that
this is already starting to change. Korea’s strengths are on batteries,
but also electric motors/generators/transformers and maybe
electricity distribution. Japan and the US continue to lead on
engines and turbines. Germany will be satisﬁed with the strong
competitive position of its export industry, including an automo-
tive sector that accounts for 13% of manufacturing output. For
France, there might be opportunities in steam generators, motor
vehicles and perhaps iron and steel, three areas where it has
prominent local champions. Italy has a mixed record overall, but
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motors/generators/transformers. The UK may have opportunities
in engines and turbines, where it has a strong base around Rolls
Royce, and perhaps electricity distribution. However, Britain
performs poorly on steam generators, domestic appliances and
(for the time being) motor vehicles.
5. Conclusions
This paper explores the question of green competitiveness,
broadly deﬁned. It is important to recognise that green growth
would ‘‘lift all the boats’’. Producers and consumers alike would
beneﬁt from an economy that is low-carbon, climate-resilient,
resource-efﬁcient and biodiverse – the key attributes associated
with green growth (Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011). Yet policy
makers are also interested to know which countries and sectors
might particularly thrive in the green economy. This is relatively
new research with few methodological or empirical precedents to
draw on in the peer-reviewed literature. (There is more in the grey
literature.)
The paper offers preliminary conclusions along three lines. First,
in terms of substantive results – the question raised in the paper’s
title – we conclude that each of the eight countries we study has
areas of green competitiveness. They also appear to have areas of
weakness, and it is likely that the green race could change the
competitive landscape. In some areas the incumbent country-
sectors lead the green race, such as motor vehicles and engines and
turbines. But in many others the countries that currently enjoy a
comparative advantage are not the leading green innovators. Some
of them could lose their competitive edge. These strengths and
weaknesses are reﬂective at least in part of the distinct
institutional networks and endowments that make up the
innovation systems of a country-sector.
The manufacturing sectors of Japan and to a lesser extent
Germany seem best positioned to take advantage of the green
shake-up. Italy’s manufacturing sector has the worst statistics and
could fall behind in the green race. There are also question marks
(based on our 2005–07 snapshot) about China. In the UK green
innovation is concentrated, perhaps strategically, in the energy
intensive industries.
We ﬁnd that the green economy is much broader than the few
ﬂagship sectors (e.g. clean energy and clean cars) on which the
debate tends to focus. These are undeniably important (Fankhau-
ser, 2012), but there are areas of green entrepreneurship and
innovation across the manufacturing sector, including in areas
such as machinery and consumer goods and on important issues
like resource efﬁciency and waste management.
The second set of conclusions concerns policy. We have not
analysed which policies are best suited to help countries or sectors
win the green race. However, it is clear that public policy is
important. A key challenge for the green economy is to overcome
persistent market failures (e.g. on innovation) and externalities
(e.g. pricing the environment), which requires well-designed and
consistent public policy intervention. Business decisions on
investment and R&D in particular respond to such policy signals.
However, a detailed analysis of green industrial policies – and their
interplay with other factors such as energy costs – is beyond the
scope of this paper.
What we can observe is that the countries in our sample have
not been particularly strategic in their green growth strategies.
There is little evidence that they are promoting green innovation
speciﬁcally in their areas of comparative advantage, thus bringing
together the two main ingredients for green growth. The
correlation between green innovation and current comparative
advantage is weak. However, a more detailed analysis at the sector
level would be required to understand these trends fully.The third set of conclusions concern methodology. We have put
forward an analytical framework, based on decomposition
analysis, which we believe is well suited to assess green
competitiveness and the potential for green growth. In fact, the
framework is suited to analyse structural transformations of any
kind, and may have applications in other areas such as
biotechnology. It also offers a basic structure for simulation
models of the green economy.
The framework highlights the need for green conversion
(through investment and innovation) in all sectors of the economy,
and not just the environmental goods and services sector. It also
emphasises the need to build on current comparative advantage to
develop and maintain market share.
We are on less solid ground when it comes to the proxies used
to measure these key factors. They are imperfect on several
accounts. There are limits to the availability of data, including on
the size of the green economy today. There are questions marks
about how accurately green patenting (our measure of innovation)
reﬂects the complex dynamics of green innovation, and how well
the place of patent registration pinpoints the actual location of
innovative activity (particularly for multinational companies).
Similarly, our measure of comparative advantage, the Balassa
index, is both too narrow (i.e. limited to traded sectors) and too
broad (i.e. covering both traditional and green comparative
advantage).
In terms of future research, it would be good to have a better
empirical understanding of how our indicators of green
innovation and comparative advantage actually contribute to
growth. Over time, this will become possible, but at the moment
it is still hard. Given that we are studying a structural
transformation, past trends are only of limited use. A fruitful
area for future research would be to investigate which sector-
level institutional forms and interactions underpin the strongest
and weakest green conversion rates observed across sectors in
our investigation.
The scope of our analysis leaves important omissions. The
eight countries we study account for almost two-thirds of global
economic output, but data constraints meant we had to leave
out many important economies, both present and emerging.
Also for data reasons the focus has been on manufacturing. This
is too narrow. Modern economies are predominantly service-
oriented, and there are considerable green opportunities in
sectors such as ﬁnance, consulting, engineering, architecture
and education. In Europe, at least, the green growth discussion
has focused heavily on manufacturing, but there are good
reasons to believe that the green economy will be a service
economy.
The processes that drive green competitiveness are inherently
unpredictable. The leaders and laggards that we have identiﬁed in
the global green race today could change rapidly in the medium
and long term future. Our hope is that the analytical framework
laid out here will be useful for measuring and understanding this
competitive process, however the race plays out.
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AnnexList of sectors
1511 Processing/preserving of meat 2696 Cutting, shaping and ﬁnishing of stone
1512 Processing/preserving of ﬁsh 2699 Other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c.
1514 Vegetable and animal oils and fats 2710 Basic iron and steel
1520 Dairy products 2720 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals
1532 Starches and starch products 2811 Structural metal products
1551 Distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits 2812 Tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal
1552 Wines 2813 Steam generators
1554 Soft drinks; mineral waters 2893 Cutlery, hand tools and general hardware
1600 Tobacco products 2899 Other fabricated metal products n.e.c.
1711 Textile ﬁbre preparation; textile weaving 2911 Engines and turbines (not for transport equipment)
1721 Made-up textile articles, except apparel 2912 Pumps, compressors, taps and valves
1722 Carpets and rugs 2913 Bearings, gears, gearing and driving elements
1723 Cordage, rope, twine and netting 2914 Ovens, furnaces and furnace burners
1729 Other textiles n.e.c. 2915 Lifting and handling equipment
1730 Knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles 2919 Other general purpose machinery
1810 Wearing apparel, except fur apparel 2921 Agricultural and forestry machinery
1820 Dressing and dyeing of fur; processing of fur 2922 Machine tools
1911 Tanning and dressing of leather 2923 Machinery for metallurgy
1912 Luggage, handbags, etc.; saddlery and harness 2924 Machinery for mining and construction
1920 Footwear 2925 Food/beverage/tobacco processing machinery
2010 Sawmilling and planing of wood 2926 Machinery for textile, apparel and leather
2021 Veneer sheets, plywood, particle board, etc. 2927 Weapons and ammunition
2022 Builders’ carpentry and joinery 2929 Other special purpose machinery
2023 Wooden containers 2930 Domestic appliances n.e.c.
2029 Other wood products; articles of cork/straw 3000 Ofﬁce, accounting and computing machinery
2101 Pulp, paper and paperboard 3110 Electric motors, generators and transformers
2102 Corrugated paper and paperboard 3120 Electricity distribution and control apparatus
2109 Other articles of paper and paperboard 3130 Insulated wire and cable
2211 Publishing of books and other publications 3140 Accumulators, primary cells and batteries
2212 Publishing of newspapers, journals, etc. 3150 Lighting equipment and electric lamps
2213 Publishing of recorded media 3190 Other electrical equipment n.e.c.
2219 Other publishing 3210 Electronic valves, tubes, etc.
2221 Printing 3220 TV/radio transmitters; line comm. apparatus
2222 Service activities related to printing 3230 TV and radio receivers and associated goods
2310 Coke oven products 3311 Medical, surgical and orthopaedic equipment
2320 Reﬁned petroleum products 3312 Measuring/testing/navigating appliances, etc.
2330 Processing of nuclear fuel 3313 Industrial process control equipment
2411 Basic chemicals, except fertilizers 3320 Optical instruments and photographic equipment
2412 Fertilizers and nitrogen compounds 3330 Watches and clocks
2413 Plastics in primary forms; synthetic rubber 3410 Motor vehicles
2421 Pesticides and other agro-chemical products 3420 Automobile bodies, trailers and semi-trailers
2422 Paints, varnishes, printing ink and mastics 3430 Parts/accessories for automobiles
2423 Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals, etc. 3511 Building and repairing of ships
2424 Soap, cleaning and cosmetic preparations 3512 Building/repairing of pleasure/sport. boats
2429 Other chemical products n.e.c. 3520 Railway/tramway locomotives and rolling stock
2430 Man-made ﬁbres 3530 Aircraft and spacecraft
2511 Rubber tyres and tubes 3591 Motorcycles
2519 Other rubber products 3592 Bicycles and invalid carriages
2520 Plastic products 3599 Other transport equipment n.e.c.
2610 Glass and glass products 3610 Furniture
2691 Pottery, china and earthenware 3691 Jewellery and related articles
2692 Refractory ceramic products 3692 Musical instruments
2693 Struct. non-refractory clay; ceramic products 3693 Sports goods
2694 Cement, lime and plaster 3694 Games and toys
2695 Articles of concrete, cement and plaster 3699 Other manufacturing n.e.c.
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